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ABSTRACT
There is considerable variation in countries’ respect for human rights.
Scholars have tried to explain this variation on the basis of current
conditions in countries—such as democracy and civil war—and events
from the recent past, such as ratification of human rights treaties. This
literature has ignored the influence that geographic factors and historical
events may have on human rights performance. Drawing on the literature
on economic development, which has shown that institutions, events, and
conditions from the distant past heavily influence the rate of economic
growth across countries today, we study whether the same factors have
influenced modern human rights performance. Our look at the data
suggests that respect for human rights today may be related to the
geographic location of affected populations centuries ago, the nature of the
institutions that emerged at that time, and cultural traits that have been
passed down from generation to generation. These results may help explain
why human rights rarely improve in countries that ratify human rights
treaties.
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INTRODUCTION
Some countries enjoy stable democratic institutions, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law. Other countries do not. A large literature
in political science tries to explain this variation, focusing on what
researchers call “repression”—censorship, intimidation, torture,
extrajudicial killing, and related coercive measures. Repression is higher in
autocratic, poor, and populous countries; in countries embroiled in
international or civil wars; and in countries with weak domestic legal
institutions.1
1 For a recent survey of this literature, see Daniel W. Hill, Jr. & Zachary M. Jones, An
Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 661 (2014). For
examples of articles written in this literature, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, &
Ryan S. Jablonski, When Do Government Resort to Election Violence?, 44 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 149
(2014); DAVENPORT, CHRISTIAN, STATE REPRESSION AND THE DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573330

A related literature has examined the influence of international human
rights treaties on the behavior of countries.2 This literature overlaps with
the literature on repression. Repression means the violation of certain
human rights—above all, political rights like the right to free speech and a
fair trial. But human rights treaties set out many other types of rights—
including broader civil and political rights (for example, religious freedom),
economic and social rights (for example, to medical care and education),
and a range of non-discrimination rights. The fine-grained nature of the
treaties has led researchers to use more fine-grained dependent variables,
like literacy and women’s health, to test whether the treaties have affected
the behavior of governments. The evidence suggests that human rights
treaties have either no effect or a modest effect on the behavior of
governments.3
The two literatures share a common starting point: that repression
and other abuses by a government reflect its immediate needs or the
conditions under which it operates. A government might use repression to
counter political dissent or a threat to its power posed by an insurgency;
human rights violations might prevail in a country because of weak courts,
a corrupt bureaucracy, a poor educational system, and other institutional
problems. Although this literature is descriptive, it leads naturally to
prescriptions that respond to the short-term nature of these problems. If
western countries encourage elections that unseat repressive governments,
PEACE (2007); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Feryal Marie Cherif, George W. Downs, & Alastair
Smith, Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights. 49 INT’L STUD. Q.
439 (2005); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A
Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993. 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291 (1999); David L.
Richards, Perilous Proxy: Human Rights and the Presence of National Elections, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 648
(1999); Scott Sigmund Gartner & Patrick M. Regan, Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear
Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence, 33 J. PEACE RES. 273 (1996); Steven C.
Poe & Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994).
For a recent survey of this literature, see Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and
Violation, 13 ANN. R. POL. SCI. 273, 288-292 (2010). For examples of work in this literature,
see Yonathan Lupu, Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements,
AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2015); ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (2014); Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of
International Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT’L ORG. 469 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, The Informative
Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI.
912 (2013); Daniel W. Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J.
POL. 1161 (2010); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
2
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or provide aid conditional on institutional reform, then repression will
decline and human rights will improve. Many scholars believe that
international human rights law can similarly improve the behavior of
countries by threatening repressive governments with sanctions,
reputational harm, and other costs.
There is a parallel between this premise and a view that once
dominated an area of economics known as development economics. This
field seeks to explain why some countries have enjoyed greater economic
growth than other countries have.4 Numerous researchers in this field have
implicitly assumed that economies should develop at some incremental rate
reflecting the advance of technology, the expansion of trade, and related
factors. Where economies did not grow at this rate, an explanation was
called for. Scholars proposed that the problem may lie in the lack of capital,
or people with the right skills, or pro-growth market institutions. All of
these explanations led to a specific development agenda: make loans to the
country or firms in it; or offer training and education to the citizens of the
country; or encourage the country to sign free trade pacts and to implement
market reforms.5
In the last fifteen years, however, a more pessimistic strain of thinking
has emerged. This new literature seeks explanations for poor economic
growth in long-term factors or fixed conditions. The most famous of these
explanations, proposed by Jared Diamond (a non-economist, but whose
work has influenced economists), is that environmental conditions as long
ago as 10,000 B.C. favored the ancestors of modern-day Europeans, who
developed a technological head-start that allowed them to rule the rest of
the planet for centuries and still enjoy a higher standard of living than most
other people.6 While many people disputed Diamond’s theory, scholars
were intrigued by his methodological assumption that cultural and
institutional pathways rooted in the distant past may determine which
countries enjoy the most economic growth and which do not. A possible
implication of this approach for the foreign aid agenda is that some
For a survey, see HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Philippe Aghion & Steven N.
Durlauf, eds., 2005).
4

For a discussion of the history of foreign aid, see WILLIAM EASTERLEY, THE WHITE
MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORT TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL
AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006).
5

JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
(1997). For statistical support for Diamond’s theory, see Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Ola Olsson,
Geography, Biogeography, and Why Some Countries Are Rich and Others Are Poor, 101 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 3715 (2003).
6
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economies will not develop as quickly as others, which implies that some
countries are doomed to be poorer than others, just depending on the part
of the world in which they are located.
Economists have proposed a variety of explanations that link
modern-day economic growth to geographic location and events remote in
history.7 One view is that a country with natural resources, access to the
sea, a temperate climate, and other favorable geographic conditions, will
benefit economically from the contribution of these factors to agricultural
productivity, industry, and trade. Other approaches are less interested in
geography than in history. Researchers have argued that institutions display
significant inertia. Countries that developed high-quality institutions in the
distant past tended to maintain them over time, as did countries that
developed low-quality institutions. Head-starts in institutional development
are preserved for centuries. And some scholars have argued that geography
and institutional development interact in complex ways. Favorable
environmental conditions in the distant past—1500 is a common point of
reference—may give rise to high-quality institutions that continue to
benefit countries even after the advantages from the environmental
conditions no longer matter. For example, one theory is that higher-growth
countries outside Europe are those that were settled by Europeans who
built viable economies that could prosper in temperate climatic conditions
rather than those that, because of the risk of disease, Europeans exploited
without regard to long-term consequences. Countries that prosper today
are those that were lucky enough to receive high-quality institutions
hundreds of years ago.8
These theories, which emphasize long-term historical and fixed
geographic conditions, have gained influence in part because the
development strategies suggested by the earlier literature have had mixed

7 See Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots of Economic
Development?, 51 J. ECON. LIT. 325 (2013) (surveying literature); Nathan Nunn, The Importance of
History for Economic Development, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 65 (2009) (same); Stanley L. Engerman &
Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Debating the Role of Institutions in Economic Development: Theory, History, and
Findings, 11 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 119 (2008) (same); Nathan Nunn, Historical Development, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 347 (same).

For a discussion of this literature, see PART I.B. The long-term persistence of cultural
and institutional norms has also received a great deal of attention among historians. See, e.g.,
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA (1989)
(describing the influence of seventeenth and eighteenth-century norms in England on
twentieth-century norms in areas of the United States where colonists settled).
8
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success at best.9 While scholars disagree about the effectiveness of foreign
aid for promoting economic growth, our reading of the literature is that if
there is a positive effect, it is quite limited.10 Conditioning aid on
institutional improvements also has no discernible effect on economic
growth.11 If a country’s rate of economic growth is the result of entrenched
institutional structures and cultural traits that have their roots in the distant
past, or in fixed geographical conditions, the failure of development
strategies is easy to understand.
In this Article, we apply some of these lessons to human rights. The
literature on international human rights law suggests that international law
has little effect on the political behavior of states, just as the development
literature suggests that foreign aid has little effect on the economic activity
of states. Just as the disappointing results in the development literature
have led to a search for long-term influences on economic growth, the
disappointing results in the international human rights law literature should
lead to a search for long-term influences on human-rights performance, or
so we argue. If the human rights performance of states is tied to conditions
hundreds of years ago, then threatening human-rights violators with
sanctions will not change their behavior.
To test this hypothesis, we draw on the new economic development
literature, which provides a set of theories and empirical results that can be
applied, mutatis mutandi, to human rights. Our working hypothesis is that the
temporally remote factors (or fixed geographic conditions) that may explain
why some countries grow faster than others may also explain why some
countries respect human rights more than others. To explore this
hypothesis, we march through the development literature, and try to bring

9 See William Easterly et al., Aid, Policies and Growth, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 774 (2004).
Some scholars have even suggested that foreign aid hurts countries by damaging democratic
institutions. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Curse of Aid (Working Paper 2005); Kevin M.
Morrison, What Can We Learn about the “Resource Curse” from Foreign Aid?, 27 WORLD BANK RES.
OBS. 52, 58-64 (2010) (surveying the literature).

See, e.g., Michael A. Clemens et al., Counting Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the
Effects of Aid on Growth, 122 ECON. J. 590 (2011); David Roodman, The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid,
Development, and Cross-Country Empirics, 21 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 255 (2007) (finding that
the results of studies that show that foreign aid promotes economic growth are “fragile”). But
see Markus Brűckner, On the Simultaneity Problem in the Aid and Growth Debate, 28 J. APPL. ECON.
126 (2013) (arguing that the effect of foreign aid on growth is understated because donors
reduce aid when growth increases).
10

11 See T.N. Srinivasan, Attacking Poverty: A Lost Opportunity—World Development Report
2000–01, 2 S. ASIA ECON. J. 123 (2001).
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the theories and data in that literature to bear on the question of why some
countries today respect human rights and others do not.12

I. THE EMPIRICAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LITERATURES
Over the last fifteen years, scholars of human rights and development
economics have used use empirical research methods to explain the
different opportunities that people have across countries. Scholars of
human rights have sought to explain differences in the amount of
repression across countries, and scholars of development economics have
sought to explain differences in wealth across countries. Despite the many
similarities between these topics, the human rights literature has almost
entirely ignored the substantial progress that has been made by
development economics.
In this part, we lay the foundation for our argument that human rights
scholars should build on the work of development economics. First, we
discuss the findings of the empirical human rights literature that has
emerged over the last 15 years. Second, we provide background on the
empirical literature on development economics. Third, we outline how the
methods and approaches used by development economics can help to
explain current human rights practices.
A. Human Rights
Since World War II, governments have expended considerable effort
to negotiate major international treaties that commit states to respecting the
rights of their citizens. It is only in the last fifteen years, however, that
political scientists and legal scholars have begun to use empirical methods
to evaluate whether these treaties have actually helped to improve human
There is a related literature in political science, which has sought to locate certain
types of political outcomes (such as authoritarianism or the subordination of women) in
culture, tradition, or religion. See, e.g., M. Steven Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism, 56 WORLD
POL. 582 (2004). Economists have also studied this hypothesis and found empirical support
for it. See, e.g., Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of
Europe, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 677 (2010) (finding that literacy rates and political institutions
in the past influence cultural traits, which in turn affect economic development). The
relationship between institutions and culture is complex. We abstract away from this
distinction because our focus is the relationship between historical factors (whether
institutional or cultural) and human rights performance today.
12
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rights practices.13 Although a few of these studies have produced limited
evidence that human rights agreements have improved human rights
practices in certain circumstances, the balance of the evidence suggests that
ratification of these agreements does not increase respect for rights.
Empirical researchers have primarily tried to test the effectiveness of
international human rights law by studying whether ratifying one of the six
“core” international human rights agreements is associated with improved
human rights practices.14 Those six agreements are: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);15 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);16 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD);17 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);18 the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT);19 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).20
Testing whether the ratification of these core human rights treaties
improves human rights practices requires finding reliable measures of rights
protections to use as a dependent variable. This has proven to be an
exceedingly difficult task, however, because there are few human rights
practices that are measured consistently across a wide range of countries
and over a long period of time. This has resulted in scholars using a broad
range of dependent variables. In an early study on the ICCPR, Camp-Keith
For papers surveying empirical research on the effect of international human rights
agreements, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human Rights, 51 J. PEACE RES. 273
(2014); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 19-25 (2012); Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN.
R. POL. SCI. 273, 288-292 (2010).
13

14

See SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 59–64. See also POSNER, supra note 2, at 22.

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
15

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
16

G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at
47 (Dec. 21, 1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.
17

18 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at
193 (Dec. 18, 1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.
19 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197
(Dec. 10, 1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987.
20 G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 at 167
(Nov. 20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
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used data published by Freedom House on the levels of freedoms in
different countries.21 Instead of using a single dataset, Hathaway engaged in
a wide-ranging data collection effort to find novel dependent variables,
including counting the number of women in national legislatures and
coding countries’ rates of torture based on State Department reports.22
More recently, empirical studies have primarily used the “CIRI” dataset
compiled by Cingranelli and Richards.23 The CIRI dataset gives every
country a score for a number of different areas of human rights for each
year from 1981 to 2010. These scores are based on the coding of reports
written by the State Department and Amnesty International. Although the
CIRI dataset has a number of shortcomings, it has been become the
standard way that scholars evaluate changes in human rights practices.24
Table 1: Primary Findings of the Effect of Treaties on Human Rights Practices
Human Rights Agreement
ICCPR CAT
CEDAW CRC
ICESCR
Camp-Keith (1999)
Null
Hathaway (2002)
Null
Worse
Null
Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2005) Worse
Worse
Worse
Worse
Worse
Neumayer (2005)
Worse
Worse
Simmons (2009)
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Hill (2010)
Worse
Worse
Mixed
Lupu (2013a)
Null
Null
Better
Lupu (2013b)
Mixed
Null = No effect on rights protection; Worse = Worse rights protection;
Better = Better rights protection; Mixed = Better rights under certain circumstances.
The results of the primary studies that have evaluated the
effectiveness of the core human rights agreements are summarized in Table
1. As Table 1 shows, the first four studies of the effectiveness of human
21 Linda Camp-Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Does It Make A Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999).
22

Hathaway, Do Human Rights, supra note 2.

David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Data Project, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 401 (2010).
23

It is worth noting that the Political Scientist Christopher Fariss recently introduced a
dataset that provides a measure of respect for human rights. See Christopher J. Fariss, Respect
for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability, 108 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014). Although this dataset has improvements over the CIRI score, it has
not yet been used by scholars researching international human rights law.
24
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CERD
Worse
-

rights agreements—Camp-Keith,25 Hathaway,26 Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui,27
and Neumayer28—either found that commitments to international human
rights agreements had no effect on rights practices, or they found evidence
that these agreements were associated with worse human rights practices.
Despite analyzing a number of different treaties using a range of data
sources and statistical techniques, these studies did not find evidence that
international human rights treaties have improved human rights practices.
The first research to produce empirical evidence that ratification of
international human rights agreements improves human rights practices
was provided in Beth Simmons’ book-length treatment of the topic.29
Simmons used a range of statistical models to test the effectiveness of 13
human rights agreements (including four of the core human rights
agreements, and several additional protocols). Simmons found that
although six of the agreements did not produce statistically significant
changes in human rights practices, there was evidence that seven of the
these agreements did.30 This included finding that ratification of an optional
protocol of the ICCPR that bans the use of the death penalty was
associated with countries being more likely to abolish the death penalty,
that ratification of the CEDAW was associated with improving the ratio of
girls to boys in schools and governments self-reporting increased access to
birth control, and that ratification of the CRC was associated with lower
rates of child labor and higher rates of child immunization.31
Although Simmons’ research concluded that human rights
agreements have had a positive effect on rights outcomes, Simmons did not
find evidence that commitments to international agreements improved
respect for human rights in all cases. Instead, Simmons found either limited
or no evidence that autocracies or stable democracies improved their rights
practices, but her evidence suggested that partially democratic states
improved their human rights practices after ratifying international
25

Camp-Keith, The United Nations, supra note 21.

26

Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 2.

27 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui. Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The
Paradox of Empty promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005).
28 Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?,
49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005).
29

SIMMONS, supra note 2.

30

Id.

31

Id.

9

agreements. Simmons argues that this is because ratification of international
agreements makes it easier for political actors to promote reforms through
the domestic political process.32
In the years since Simmons’ book was released, three new studies
have used new statistical techniques to reanalyze the question. A study by
Hill33 and two studies by Lupu34 used almost identical data and very similar
statistical techniques. Hill found that ratification of the ICCPR has resulted
in more physical integrity violations, and that ratification of the CAT is
associated with more torture.35 Hill’s study did suggest that ratification of
the CEDAW has improved respect for women’s political rights, but that
the treaty has had no effect on women’s social or economic rights.36
Lupu’s first study largely replicated the approach used by Hill, but
used a more sophisticated statistical technique to help address selection
effects. Lupu found that the ICCPR and CAT have had no effect on rights
protection (instead of making it worse as Hill suggested), and that the
CEDAW has improved women’s political, economic, and social rights.37 In
a related paper, Lupu argued that human rights agreements may have an
effect when they are enforceable through the domestic political process.38
To test this theory, Lupu reanalyzed the effect of the ICCPR, and found
that the ICCPR is associated with improved freedom of speech, religion,
and assembly and association. The paper further found, however, that the
ICCPR has not improved physical integrity rights.
It is worth noting, however, that even for the studies that found
encouraging statistically significant improvements in human rights
practices, the size of the effect is quite modest. For example, the one
positive result that Hill39 found was that ratification of CEDAW improves
women’s political rights, but his results suggest that the convention seems
to have led to roughly a 2% decrease in the chance that states would be
classified as the most oppressive by the CIRI dataset, and a 5% increase in
32

Id.

33

Hill, Estimating the Effects, supra note 2.

34

Lupu, The Informative Power, supra note 2; Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.

35

Hill, Estimating the Effects, supra note 2.

36

Id.

37

Lupu, The Informative Power, supra note 2.

38

Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.

39

Hill, Estimating the Effects, supra note 2.
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the probability that states would be in the best category. Other studies that
found positive effects did not quantify them in a clear way, leaving
ambiguous whether the effects were substantively important. It is important
to note that statistically significant changes in rights practices are not
necessarily substantively large changes in rights protection.

Figure 1: Human Rights Practices Before & After Treaty Ratification

11

To get a sense of magnitudes, consider the graphs in Figure 1. These
graphs show the trends in human rights practices in a particular country in
the five years before and after it ratifies three major human rights data. The
first three panels of Figure 1 use data from the CIRI project, which scores
countries’ protection of a number of human rights. The CIRI project scores
countries in each year as 0 if there are frequent rights violations, 1 if there
are occasional rights violations, and 2 if there are no reported rights
violations. Upward trends are thus associated with improved rights
practices.
Panel 1 examines changes in four important rights in the years before
and after ratification of the ICCPR, and shows that there is very little
noticeable improvement in countries’ rights protection after the treaty goes
into effect. Panel 2 repeats the same exercise with the ratification of the
CEDAW, and only finds evidence that there is a positive trend in women’s
political rights. This finding is consistent with Hill, who found a positive
effect of CEDAW ratification on women’s political rights, but not on
women’s economic or social rights.40 It’s important to note that the data
reveals an upward trend in women’s political rights before countries ratify
the CEDAW, and ratification does not appear to accelerate the rate of
improvement. Panel 3 shows that after ratification of the CAT, protection
from torture does not improve (and is actually slightly worse). This result is
consistent with a number of studies—from Hathaway to Lupu—that have
not found evidence that the ratification of the CAT reduces torture rates.
Panel 4 repeats the same exercise for ratification of the CAT, but does
not use the CIRI data. Fariss recently used a variety of data sources to
create a composite measure of latent rights protection.41 The measure—
which we will refer to as the Human Rights Score—combines information
from a variety of data sources into a single composite measure of human
rights repression by using a dynamic modeling process that accounts for
temporal biases in reporting on human rights over time. The Human Rights
Score dataset looks at 197 countries’ human rights practices from 1949 to
2010. The human rights practices in question are those that relate to
political repression—extrajudicial killing, torture, censorship, and the like.
Thus, the Human Rights Score can be taken as a rough measure of a country’s
40

Hill, Estimating the Effects, supra note 2.

41 See Fariss, supra note 24. This measure was also discussed in Keith E. Schnakenberg
& Christopher J. Fariss, Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices, 2 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS
1 (2014).
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compliance with the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights,
which bars those activities.
The average level of repression for all observations in the dataset is
coded as 0, and the score that a country receives is the number of standard
deviations that it is away from 0. For example, North Korea and South
Sudan both have a Human Rights Score of roughly -2 in 2010, which indicates
that they are both two standard deviations worse that the average level of
repression of all countries in the world over all years between 1949 and
2010. The United States has a score of 0.4 for 2010, which is slightly better
than the dataset’s average. Iceland and Luxembourg are at the top of the list
in 2010, with scores of roughly 4. We use the 2010 Human Rights Scores for
each country in most of our figures.42 In addition to correcting for biases in
other commonly used data sources, Fariss’ measure has the useful quality
that, unlike most other data sources, it is continuous rather than
dichotomous or ternary. This makes the data more useful for regressions
and graphical representation.
Using this data, Fariss argues that rights have improved over the last
thirty years, and moreover, that countries that have ratified the CAT have
lower rates of rights violations than those that do not.43 The evidence in
Panel 4 is consistent with Fariss’ claim that rights protections have
improved slightly after countries ratify the CAT.44 It is worth noting,
however, that the trend emerges before countries ratify the CAT. Fariss’
data may simply be picking up improvements over time that are not
attributable to international treaties. Despite the sophistication of the
statistical techniques used by scholars, issues of causation dog this research.
It is very hard to know whether the upward trends are driven by treaty
ratification or omitted variables.45
One cannot reject all possible theories that human rights treaties
improve human rights performance. It is possible that improvements in
human rights lag ratification by ten, twenty, or fifty years. It is also possible
that treaties work together rather than individually, so that they affect the
The two exceptions are Figures 11 and 13. In those Figures, we use data on women’s
rights from the CIRI project. For information on the CIRI project, see Cingranelli & Richards,
supra note 23. See also David L. Cingranellli & David L. Richards, Measuring the Level, Pattern, and
Sequence of Government Respect for Psychical Integrity Rights, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 407 (1999).
42

43

Id.

44

Id.

45 See Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’s “Mobilizing for Human
Rights,” 44 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 819 (2012).
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behavior of governments only if governments ratify more than a threshold
number of treaties or only if more than a threshold number of
governments ratify human rights treaties. Treaties may also improve human
rights only if the right conditions—institutional or otherwise—exist in a
country.46 That said, there is little evidence that any of these theories are
correct, and they are probably unprovable in the short term.
We should also mention several additional types of studies that have
shed light on the relationship between human rights treaties and the
behavior of governments. First, recent research has tested whether states
receive rewards for ratifying international human rights agreements. One
theory that has been put forward to explain why states would commit
themselves to international human rights agreements is that those states
may receive benefits from powerful countries like the United States and
members of the European Union. To test this theory, Nielsen and
Simmons examined whether states receive either tangible rewards
(international aid, trade agreements, or investment agreements) or intangible
rewards (praise and criticism by powerful countries and NGOs) after
ratifying the ICCPR or the CAT.47 Their research found “almost no
evidence” that states receive tangible or intangible rewards after ratifying
international human rights treaties.48
Second, two recent studies have tested whether states that ratify
international human rights agreements are more likely to include rights
protections in their national constitutions. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons
tested whether constitutions written after the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ICCPR include rights similar to those agreements.49
Their study found evidence that national constitutions written after these
agreements did include similar rights to those agreements, and that this
effect was stronger for countries that had ratified the ICCPR.50 Their study
thus suggested that international human rights agreements might produce
changes in domestic law.51 More recently, Versteeg tested whether prior
ratification of seven major human rights agreements makes countries more
46

SIMMONS, supra note 2.

47 Richard A. Nielsen & Beth A. Simmons, Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating
in the International Human Rights Regime, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming 2015).
48

Id.

Zachary Elkins et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and
Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013).
49

50

Id.

51

Id.
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likely to include the rights codified in those agreements in their national
constitutions.52 She found that the only treaties that have had a statistically
significant effect on the rights included in national constitutions are the
CAT and the additional protocol to the ICCPR on the death penalty.53 In a
separate study, Law and Versteeg found that constitutional protections are
often “shams”—they are not actually enforced, and so abuses are not
stopped.54 If human rights treaties improve paper constitutional protections
that are not enforced, then the treaties can hardly be regarded as successful.
Third, a number of empirical studies have examined whether states
that violate human rights are punished by having the foreign aid they
receive from other countries reduced. Nielsen tested whether violations of
physical integrity rights reduced the amount of foreign aid that 118
developing countries (including both ratifiers and non-ratifiers of human
rights agreements) received from 17 different OECD donors.55 Nielsen did
find that donors impose aid sanctions as a result of human right violations,
but that these sanctions are imposed selectively.56 However, he found
“virtually no evidence” that states sanction human rights violators because
of normative commitments to human rights protection on the part of the
sanctioning states.57 Instead, Nielsen found that states were willing to
ignore human rights norms when the violations were committed by the
donors’ allies.58
Fourth, scholars have also tried to test the effectiveness of
international human rights law through survey experiments.59 The

Mila Versteeg, Law versus Norms: The Impact of International human Rights Treaties on
National Bills of Rights, 171 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 87 (2015).
52

53

Id.

54

David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863 (2013).

Richard A. Nielsen, Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions Against Repressive
States, 57 INT’L STUD. Q. 891 (2013).
55

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

For more information on this method, see Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley. Why the
Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173 (2013). Studies
that have tested the effectiveness of human rights treaties using experiments include: Adam
Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental
Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137 (2014); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes
Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2012); Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N.
Shapiro, Does International Law Affect Willingness to Punish Foreign Human Rights Abusers? (Working
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motivation behind these studies is that one mechanism that has been
proposed to explain why ratification of international human rights
agreements may have an effect is that ratification increases domestic
political support for improved rights practices. The idea is that—in
countries that are at least partially democratic—citizens will become more
supportive of human rights after learning their government has made an
international commitment, and that support will compel leaders to make
policy changes. Survey experiments have tested this idea by providing
samples of American respondents with information on a policy that violates
international human rights standards, and randomly providing some
respondents information on prior human rights commitments. Using this
approach, one of us found that information on international law increased
support for reforming solitary confinement practices by about 4%,60 and
Wallace found that references to international law dropped support for the
use of torture by about 6%.61 These studies have limitations. Most notable
is the fact that there is not yet evidence showing that modest changes in
public support for improving human rights are likely to translate to changes
in public policy.
B. Development
Development economics attempts to answer the question why some
countries have become richer than others.62 An early strand of that
literature argued that economic development is simply a function of good
policies.63 For example, one country might be richer than another because
the government of the first country has built infrastructure such as roads
and canals, or has avoided ruinous wars, or has avoided excessive taxation
that destroyed incentives to work. In the case of newly independent
countries, poverty may result from lack of education and insufficient
capital. To the extent that these theories are true, policy prescriptions for
advancing economic development of poor countries are straightforward.
Paper 2009); Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs
(Working Paper 2008).
60

Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements, supra note 59.
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Wallace, International Law, supra note 59.

62 For a recent survey, see Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7,
which we use to organize our discussion here.
63 See, e.g., RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1973) (attributing low rates of development among poor countries to poor
policy choices).
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Those countries simply need to build infrastructure, reform the tax system,
increase education, and so on. Foreign countries can help by providing
technical assistance, cash, and loans.64
This view has always had its skeptics.65 It seems too simple to say that
all a government in a poor country has to do is adopt sensible policies that
the rich world has already figured out. Moreover, the actual efforts to help
poor countries with technical assistance and loans have yielded
disappointing results. Foreign aid—whether direct aid, loans, or technical
assistance—does not appear to advance economic growth systematically
and robustly.66 These findings raise the question whether economic growth
rates might be determined by factors that are outside the immediate control
of policymakers.
And, indeed, the view that wealth is rooted in the natural or historical
conditions of a country has become increasingly influential. One idea,
which goes back centuries, is that countries with a better climate, more
natural resources, and similar favorable natural endowments should be
wealthier than countries that lack these resources.67 This idea lost favor as it
became clear that some countries that lack natural endowments have
become very wealthy—Japan, for example.
But recent work that uses statistical analysis has found that, as a
general pattern, countries with more favorable geographic conditions are
wealthier. As Figure 2 shows, countries at higher or lower latitudes have a
more temperate climate suitable for agriculture than countries near the
equator, and they are wealthier. Countries with a lower percentage of their
land area in the tropics are wealthier. Landlocked countries and countries
that lack navigable rivers are poorer than other countries because of limited
access to trade. Countries with naturally occurring flora and fauna
appropriate for agriculture and animal husbandry are wealthier than
countries without them. The positive correlation between geographic

64 See, e.g., Paul Collier & David Dollar, Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy
Reform and International Aid Can Meet International Development Goals, 29 WORLD DEV. 1787
(2001).
65 For a discussion, see William Easterly, National Policies and Economic Growth: A
Reappraisal, in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1015.
66
67

TRANS.,

See supra note 10.
See, e.g., CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (THOMAS NUGENT
2011) (speculating in 1748 about the relationship between geography and national

wealth).
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favorability within a country and its modern-day per capita income is
robust.68
Figure 2: Latitude & Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in 2010
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The geographic theory of economic development has been challenged
on various grounds. One source of discomfort with it is that it implies that
the relative wealth of countries should never change (putting aside
expansion through conquest and union). Yet the relative wealth of
countries has varied considerably over the centuries. Indeed, the relative
wealth of countries in 1500 as proxied by population density is negatively
68

Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328-31.
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correlated to their relative wealth today.69 China, for example, had one of
the leading economies from ancient times until the 19th century, and then
became a poor country until quite recently. While Latin American and
North American countries had about equal resources when colonized by
Europeans, today the North American countries are significantly
wealthier.70 Moreover, some evidence indicates that countries with
abundant resources are subject to the “resource curse”—low economic
growth despite abundant resources because of battles among groups for
control of the resources, among other problems.71
These observations have led to a new line of research (albeit with
roots in the 1970s72) that focuses on the quality of institutions as they have
developed over time. Differences in institutional quality, for example, may
explain why some countries benefit from natural resources while others
succumb to the resource curse.73 The most famous institutional argument is
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (AJR) institutional transplant
argument.74 They claim that when Europeans colonized other parts of the
world, they sometimes but not always transplanted their institutions in their
colonies. AJR hypothesize that Europeans constructed low-quality
institutions when they sought merely to extract resources, and high-quality
institutions when they sought to engage in long-term investment.
Extraction was used when conditions were too harsh for colonists to
survive for a long period of time because of disease; or because resources
were abundant and easy to access. Otherwise, settlers invested for the long
term by transplanting their legal, political, and economic institutions.

69

Id. at 332-34. For some groups of countries, there is no relationship.

70 Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Institutions, and
Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the
United States, in HOW LATIN AMERICA FELL BEHIND: ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORIES
OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO, 1800–1914, at 260 (STEPHEN HABER ED., 1997).
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See Morrison, supra note 9.

72 LANCE DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971).
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See Morrison, supra note 9, at 56-57.

Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001); Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of Fortune:
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q. J. ECON.
1231 (2002).
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While AJR’s empirical work has been criticized,75 their paper set off a
flurry of research on the historical origins of institutions. As we will discuss
in greater detail in Part II, researchers discovered a range of correlations
between conditions in the distant past and measures of institutional quality
today. The wealthier countries hundreds of years ago tend to be the
wealthier countries today, even controlling for geographic conditions.76 A
likely reason for this “lag” effect is that the wealth is generated by
institutions that persist or reproduce themselves over time. Other work
suggests that norms, institutions, and practices that emerged in very
different economic conditions hundreds of years ago tend to persist—to be
maintained by populations even when they migrate. For example, one study
suggests that agricultural societies in which the plow was used because of
the nature of the soil and the crops that could grow in it tended to have
unequal gender norms (because men were needed to drive the plow, and so
women were confined to the home) that have persisted for centuries.77
Agricultural societies that did not use the plow and so employed female
labor in the fields generated more equal gender norms that have also
persisted despite the radically different economic circumstances that prevail
today.78 In a related vein, a study found that areas in Africa that were raided
by slavers in the 1800s are poorer today than those areas were not—
suggesting that the slave-raids destroyed institutions that minimized conflict
and supported economic cooperation.79
75 See David Y. Albouy, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation: Comment, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3059 (2012) (criticizing) and Daron Acemoglu et
al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply, 102 AM.
ECON. REV. 3077 (2012) (defending).
76 Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 327 n.2; Quamrul Ashraf
& Oded Galor, Dynamics and Stagnation in the Malthusian Epoch, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2003
(2011).
77 Alberto Alesina et. al, On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough, 128 Q. J.
ECON. 469 (2013).
78 For other papers that find correlations between measures of the well-being of
women today and remote historical conditions, see Gilles Duranton, et al., Family Types and the
Persistence of Regional Disparities in Europe, 85 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 33 (2009) (medieval family
structure); Melanie Meng Xue, Textiles and the Historical Emergence of Gender Equality in China
(unpub. m.s. 2014) (textile production); Gautam Hazarika et al., The Role of Historical Resource
Constraints in Modern Gender Inequality: A Cross-Country Analysis (unpub. m.s. 2014) (resource
scarcity) and Pauline Grosjean & Rose Khattar, It’s Raining Men! Hallelujah? (unpub. m.s. 2014)
(population sex ratios).
79 Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, 123 Q. J. ECON. 139
(2008). For related work that shows that a history of slavery is correlated with low levels of
well-being or with human rights violations today, see Warren Whatley & Rob Gillezeau, The
Impact of the Transatlantic Slave Trade on Ethnic Stratification in Africa, 1010 AM. ECON. REV. 571
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In another line of research, scholars have investigated whether
migration and the composition of populations have influenced long-term
economic development. One might think that institutional advantages that
arise in one country would erode over time as populations in other
countries imitated them. Substantial empirical evidence shows that norms
and institutions diffuse across populations and countries.80 Why doesn’t
diffusion eliminate advantages from centuries in the past?
An intuitive explanation is that geographical barriers like bodies of
water and mountain ranges isolate populations and block or slow down
diffusion.81 We discussed that theory above. Spolaore and Wacziarg use
genetic distance as a proxy for remoteness.82 Because populations with
more distant common ancestors are geographically more remote from each,
genetic distance serves as a proxy for cultural distance. The authors provide
evidence that genetic distance from the US population is negatively
correlated with economic growth. In related work, Ashraf and Galor show
that population diversity itself is related to economic growth. Populations
with very high and very low levels of genetic diversity are poorer than
populations with midlevel genetic diversity. Ashraf and Galor argue that
too much diversity interferes with governance while too little diversity is
bad for the economy.83 The wealth of countries today reflects paths of
migration thousands of years ago.
While all of this research has been hotly debated, a consensus does
seem to be forming that geography matters for economic growth both
directly and by virtue of its effect on institutions, and that history, including
remote history, also matters a great deal. The quality of institutions changes
slowly over time, and so the quality of institutions today is heavily
(2011) (finding that in Africa a history of slavery is positively correlated with current ethnic
fragmentation); Daron Acemoglu, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, & James A. Robinson, Finding
Eldarado: Slavery and Long Run Development in Colombia, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 534 (2012) (finding
that in Columbia a history of slavery is positively correlated with bad performance on current
indicators of well-being, like poverty, school enrollment, and vaccination; Graziella Bertocchi
& Arcangelo Dimico, Slavery, Education, and Inequality, 51 EUR. ECON. REV. 70 (2014) (finding
that in the United States a history of slavery is positively correlated with current economic
inequality).
See KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION:
HOW HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013).
80
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See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328-31.

82 Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, The Diffusion of Development, 124 Q. J. ECON.
469 (2009).
83 Quamrul Ashraf & Oded Galor, The “Out of Africa” Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity,
and Comparative Economic Development, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2013).
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influenced by historical factors over which policymakers have no control.
The research, while fascinating, has an unsettling implication: that efforts to
help countries improve their rate of economic growth will be constrained
by significant exogenous factors. The reason that development assistance
has failed to promote economic growth in foreign countries may be that
economic growth in those countries is chiefly a function of historical and
geographic influences that development assistance cannot affect.
C. Comparing the Literatures
It should be clear by now that the development literature has devoted
considerably more attention to historical and geographic conditions than
the human rights literature has. The focus has been driven in party by
methodological questions related to the difficulty with using statistical
analysis to show causation. Scholars have understood for a long time that
wealthier countries have better institutions, but until recently they could not
determine the direction of causality: whether good institutions cause wealth,
or wealth causes good institutions. But wealth today cannot cause favorable
geographic conditions or advanced technology in 1500, so correlations
between wealth today and these factors strongly suggest that the direction
of causality goes from those factors to wealth rather than vice versa.
Institutions—or at least, historical conditions—matter for economic
development.
Human rights researchers have also struggled with the problem of
endogeneity. Does ratification of human rights treaties cause countries to
improve human rights, or does the improvement of human rights,
occurring because of changes in social norms or wealth or some other
factor, cause countries to ratify human rights treaties? So far, researchers
have put relatively little effort into determining the direction of causality, no
doubt because until recently most studies found no correlations.84
Whether or not human rights treaties cause improvements in human
rights, they clearly cannot be the whole story. After all, human rights in
received greater protection in many countries before the human rights
regime was created than they receive in dozens of countries that have
ratified the treaties. In Part II, we turn to alternative explanations.
Neumayer, supra note 28, tried to account for the endogenous relationship between
treaty ratification and compliance by using Heckman models; SIMMONS, supra note 2, used
instrumental variable regression; and Hill, Estimating the Effects supra note 2, Lupu, The
Informative Power, supra note 2, Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2, and Lupu, Legislative Veto Players,
supra note 2 all used matching techniques.
84
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II. HYPOTHESES
Our conjecture that geographical and historical factors affect
countries’ modern-day human rights performance is inspired by the
findings of the development literature. Both economic development and
respect for rights may be outcomes of the same underlying factors—for
example, cultural traditions that favor respect for individuals, high-quality
institutions for resolving disputes, well-functioning political institutions,
isolation from hostile foreign countries, remoteness from sources of
cultural or institutional diffusion, or abundant natural resources that limit
the sources of conflict. In the following sections, we explore these ideas by
describing selected hypotheses from the development literature; suggesting
reasons why the hypotheses might apply to human rights performance as
well as economic development; and providing some initial evidence bearing
on those hypotheses.85 Except where otherwise indicated, our dependent
variable is Fariss’ Human Rights Score.86
A. Geography and Climate
Economists have long speculated that geographic and climatic
conditions affect economic development. Countries with temperate
climates, abundant natural resources, and favorable conditions for trade—
for example, access to the sea—should be wealthier than those that lack
these advantages. We consider whether two geographic features—latitude
and access to water—can help to explain human rights practices.
1. Latitude
Geographic advantages, as proxied by distance from the equator
(latitude), whether a country is landlocked or not, whether it is an island,
and percentage of a country’s area in the tropics, accounts for as much as
44 percent of a country’s log per capital income in 2005.87 The causal
explanation for this correlation is hotly contested.88 Some scholars argue
We rely on a recent survey piece on development economics, and organize our paper
roughly in the same way that this paper is organized for ease of comparison. See Spolaore &
Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7. We provide correlations and statistical
significance for all our tests in the appendix.
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that geographic advantages directly generate wealth89; others argue that
geographical advantages favor high-quality institutions, which generate
wealth.90 Regardless of the explanation, regression results provide strong
evidence for the correlation between latitude and current wealth.91
Given this well-established relationship, it is worth asking whether
geography could also affect human rights. This may occur for a number of
reasons. For example, it could be the case that people who live in more
temperate climates with more abundant resources are less likely to fight
over resources, and are therefore more likely to respect each other’s
interests. If that is the case, then countries with geographic advantages
should also have stronger human rights. If this were true, we would expect
a positive relationship between the absolute value of countries’ latitude and
their respect for human rights.
Figure 3 provides a visual test of our first hypothesis, which is that
countries with more temperate climates have higher Human Rights Scores
than countries with less temperate climates. Our independent variable is the
absolute value of latitude.92 A higher value represents greater distance from
the equator, which (roughly) indicates a more temperate climate. As Figure
2 shows, countries with a more temperate climate also have stronger human
rights. To be more exact, the correlation between these two variables is
0.32, and it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The evidence is
consistent with the geographical hypothesis that human rights flourish in
countries with favorable geographic conditions.

See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew D. Mellinger, & John L. Gallup, The Geography of
Poverty and Wealth, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 71 (Mar. 2001); William A. Masters & Margaret S.
McMillian, Climate and Scale in Economic Growth, 6 J. ECON. GROWTH 167 (2001).
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See generally Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328 Table 1.

92 This data is from the Global Development Network Growth Database, available at
<http://www.nyudri.org/resources/global-development-network-growth-database/>
(last
visited February 27, 2015).
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Figure 3: Latitude and Human Rights Score

2. Access to Water
Economists have also measured advantageous geography by using
access to the sea as a proxy.93 Countries with ample territory that is close to
a river or ocean can more easily exploit maritime resources and trade with
other countries, than countries that are landlocked. As a result, empirical
studies have consistently found that variables that measure access to
waterways are highly correlated with economic outcomes.94
It is also plausible that access to water would affect current levels of
respect for human rights. This could simply be because access to water will
have a current effect on countries’ level of wealth, which in turn is likely to
lead to higher rates of respect for human rights. Alternatively, it may be the
93

See, e.g., Ashraf & Galor, Dynamics, supra note 76, at 2016.
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case that access to water increases respect for human rights by facilitating
the spread of ideas and cultures. Regardless of the mechanism, the clear
hypothesis is that variables that measure access to rivers and oceans should
have a positive relationship to current human rights practices.
Figure 4: Access to Water and Human Rights Score

Figure 4 shows the relationship between human rights and two
measures of access to the sea.95 As panel A shows, human rights are
stronger in countries that are close to a coast or a river than in countries
that are landlocked. Mean distance to a coast or River has a -0.27
correlation with Human Rights Score, which is statistically significant at the
0.01 level. In other words, the more of a country’s territory that is far from
oceans or rivers, the worse its human rights practices are. Panel B also
shows that human rights are stronger in countries with a higher percentage
Both variables are from Ashraf & Galor’s dataset on development economics. Ashraf
& Galor’s, Dynamics, supra note 76. This data is publically available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bw0xeVVYEG5XTTBSbTRHdGdiMnc/edit?usp=sharing
(last visited February 27, 2015).
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of land that is within 100 kilometers of a coast or river. The relationship
has a 0.40 correlation with the Human Rights Score, which is also statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. Thus, both variables that measure access to
water are highly correlated with current human rights practices, which is
consistent with the geographic hypothesis that human rights flourish in
countries with favorable geographic conditions.
3. Conclusion
In sum, we find preliminary evidence for the geographic hypothesis of
human rights. This evidence suggests that repression and other human
rights violations occur more frequently in countries with harsh
environmental conditions than in countries with more favorable geographic
conditions.
B. Institutional Transplant
Another theory is that the historical quality of institutions determines
economic development.96 One version of this theory is what we call the
“institutional transplant” theory, which holds that the economy growth rate
of a former colony is a function of the institutions transplanted to it by an
imperial power. We explore the relationship between two variables that are
used as proxies for the institutional transplant theory—settler mortality and
the European share of the population—and current human rights practices.
1. Settler Mortality
AJR argue that current differences between countries level of wealth
can be explained largely by the quality of their institutions. AJR further
argue that high-quality institutions are not created overnight. Instead,
whether a country has high-quality institutions now is heavily influenced by
the quality of their institutions hundreds of years ago. As a measure of
institutional quality hundreds of years ago, AJR used the settler mortality
rates in countries colonized by Europe because colonizers did not establish
high-quality institutions in places that were hazardous to their health. After
estimating a number of different regressions, AJR found strong evidence
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that settler mortality is negatively associated with countries’ current
wealth.97
Similarly, it may be the case that the human rights performance of
former colonies can be traced to institutional transplants. One of the major
findings of the empirical human rights literature is that institutions can
influence the effectiveness of human rights protections. For example, one
paper found that the presence of an independent judiciary increases the
likelihood that human rights will be protected.98 Another study found that
countries with legislative veto players are more likely to comply with their
human rights commitments.99 Both of these finding suggest that highquality institutions should be associated with better human rights
performances, and the quality of these institutions may have deep historical
roots. The clear hypothesis that this suggests is that, in former colonies
outside Europe, human rights should be stronger in countries that received
higher-quality institutions from their colonial overlords.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the key variable used by AJR
to measure institutional quality—the log of settler mortality at the time of
colonization100—and countries’ Human Rights Scores. As the figure clearly
shows, higher rates of settler mortality are associated with worse human
rights in 2010. The log of settler mortality has a -0.34 correlation with
Human Rights Scores, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Unlike
AJR, we do not try to show causation. Instead, these results are preliminary
evidence in support of the Institutional Transplant hypothesis.

Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins, supra note 74; Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of
Fortune, supra note 74.
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See Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.

99

See Lupu, Legislative Veto Players, supra note 2.

100 This variable is taken from AJR’s replication dataset. Acemoglu et al., The Colonial
Origins,
supra
note
74.
This
data
is
publically
available
at
<http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/data/ajr2001> (last visited February 27, 2015).
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Figure 5: Settler Mortality and Human Rights Score

2. European Share of the Population
Other scholars have investigated the institutional transplant
hypothesis by studying the relationship between the European share of the
population at the time of colonization and current economic wealth.101
Most notably, Easterly and Levine found that European share of the
population during colonization is a statistically significant predictor of
current wealth, even when controlling for a number of other variables that
measure state history—like early adoption of agriculture.102 Easterly and

101 See generally Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 338-41. See
also Louis Putterman & David N. Weil, Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long-Run Determinants
of Economic Growth and Inequality, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1627 (2010); William Easterly & Ross Levine,
The European Origins of Economic Development (Working Paper, 2014), available at
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w18162.pdf > (last visited February 27, 2015).
102

See Easterly & Levine, supra note 101.
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Levine have argued that their results suggest the importance of the human
capital that was brought by early European settlers during colonization.103
As another way to explore the institutional transplant hypothesis, we
examined the relationship between human rights and the European share
of the population during colonization as a proxy for early institutions.104
The justification for doing so is that European settlers created institutions
in the areas they colonized, and that larger European populations created
more substantial institutions. The hypothesis is thus that there should be a
positive correlation between the European share of the population during
colonization and current human rights practices.
Figure 6: European Share of Population and Human Rights Scores
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This variable is from Easterly & Levine’s dataset on economic development. See
Easterly & Levine, supra note 101. This data is publically available at
<http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Papers/appendix_europeans_16oct2013.xls>
(last visited February 27, 2015).
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Figure 6 shows the relationship between the European share of the
population at colonization and current Human Rights Scores. As Figure 6
shows, larger European shares at the time of colonization are associated
with better Human Rights Scores. This relationship between these two
variables has a correlation of 0.34, and is statistically significant at the 0.01
level. These results thus suggest that Easterly & Levine’s argument about
the influence of institutions and human capital on current economic wealth
may also hold for current human rights practices.
3. Conclusion
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that human rights
receive greater protection in non-European countries that received higherquality institutions from imperial powers. Scholars have developed other
proxies for institutional quality that we address in the next section.
C. Institutional Lag
Institutional transplant is a special case of what we called
“institutional lag,” which refers to the idea that the quality of institutions
today depends on the quality of institutions in the past, for all countries,
not just for those that have received transplants. Researchers who have
studied this hypothesis have used various proxies to measure directly (albeit
crudely) the quality of the institutions in the past. We specifically explore
the relationship between three measures of institutional lag and current
human rights practices: (1) legal origins; (2) historical population density;
and (3) state centralization and the onset of agriculture.
1. Common Law and Civil Law
Many authors have argued that whether a legal system is rooted in the
common law or in civil law determines economic development.105 They
argue that because civil law was developed by relatively absolute
monarchies as a way to control the population through subordinate judges,
civil law systems favor centralization of power that disrupts markets. By
contrast, the common law was developed in a relatively decentralized
system and preserved the dispersion of power in institutions that featured
independent judges and an adversarial style of adjudication, which
constrained the central government and promoted markets. While the
105

See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002).
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literature does not claim that civil law systems are “lower-quality” than
common law systems in an inherent sense, it does claim that civil law
systems lead to lower economic growth, and there is some evidence for this
hypothesis.106
One might similarly argue that if civil law systems enhance the power
of central governments, they may also enhance its power to violate human
rights, and thus should lead to more human rights violations. A possible
problem with this argument is that the relationship between government
centralization and human rights is not obvious. Many human rights obligate
the government to intervene—to protect children from abuse, for example,
or to require employers to accommodate workers with disabilities, or to
abolish slavery—and such intervention may require a strong central
government with control over the courts rather than a weak central
government. Nonetheless, the hypothesis is sufficiently plausible to be
worth exploring.
Figure 7: Legal Origins and Human Rights Scores
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Figure 7 shows the relationship between countries’ legal origins and
their current Human Rights Scores.107 In Panel A, countries are coded as “1”
if they have British legal origins (which is a standard measure of having a
common law tradition), and “0” otherwise. In Panel B, countries are coded
as “1” if they have a French legal origins (which is a standard measure of
having a civil law legal tradition), and “0” otherwise. The figure shows that
having British legal origins is very weakly associated with better Human
Rights Scores, and that having French legal origins is very weakly associated
with worse Human Rights Scores.108 Both results are far from statistically
significant. Our preliminary analysis thus does not suggest a relationship
between legal origins and current human rights practices, but obviously
more research would have to be done to examine if a relationship does
exist.
2. Population Density
Researchers have argued that population density in the past may be a
good proxy for the level of economic development at the time.109 The
argument is based on the Malthusian insight that, before birth control,
economic growth should lead to a larger population. Population density in
the past could be interpreted directly as a measure of economic growth or
indirectly as a measure of the quality of economic institutions. Evidence
suggests that countries with the highest economic growth also had the
highest population density in 1500 and 1000, and so it has been suggested
that this is evidence of a long time-lag in the quality of economic
institutions.110
One can construct a similar argument about human rights. Suppose
that population density in, say, 1500 reflected the level of economic
development, and the level of economic development reflected the quality
of economic institutions. One might further speculate that a country with
high-quality economic institutions also had high-quality legal and political
107 The legal origins data is from the Global Development Network Growth Database,
available at http://www.nyudri.org/resources/global-development-network-growth-database/
(last visited February 17, 2015).
108 Our results are thus consistent with the findings in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell et al.,
Domestic Legal Traditions and States’ Human Rights Practices, 50 J. PEACE RES. 189 (2013), who,
however, use as their dependent variable a measure of political terror.

Spolaore & Wacziag, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 327 n.2. See also Ashraf
& Galor, Dynamics, supra note 76.
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institutions, based on the plausible assumption that “economic institutions”
just are legal and political institutions that protect property rights and
enforce contracts. It would follow, if the institutional lag hypothesis is
correct, that such countries would also have fewer human rights violations
today.
Figure 8: Population Density and Human Rights Scores

Figure 8 shows the relationship between past population density and
Human Rights Scores.111 Panel A shows the relationship between the log of
population density in 1000 AD and Human Rights Scores, and Panel B shows
the relationship between the log of population density in 1500 AD and
Human Rights Scores. Contrasting with existing research that finds a positive
relationship between past population density and current wealth,112 both
panels show a very slight negative relationship between historical
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population density and Human Rights Scores. That said, neither of these
correlations is statistically significant.
3. State Centralization and Onset of Agriculture
Researchers have argued that state centralization and the number of
years since the adoption of agriculture may be proxies for institutional
quality. The research in this area addresses whether populations that
migrate bring their institutions (or human capital or other norms and
values) with them, so that the quality of institutions in country X depends
on the quality of institutions of the population that migrated to the country
rather than the quality of institutions that existed in that area before the
migrants arrived.113 While state centralization and adoption of agriculture
may seem like cruder proxies for institutional quality than the others we
have discussed, they have the virtue that they can be traced back along the
paths of popular migration. This research finds some evidence for the
hypothesis that populations that experienced state centralization earlier and
adopted agriculture earlier also had higher quality institutions than other
populations.114
This hypothesis is at least superficially in tension with the hypothesis
that countries with civil law traditions are more likely to violate human
rights than common law countries are. The state centralization hypothesis
suggests that states with strong centralization respects human rights, while
the legal tradition hypothesis suggests that states with strong centralization
violates human rights. But there are different causal factors in play here.
The state centralization hypothesis rests on a theory about the quality of
institutions. States with a history of powerful institutions are more likely to
have high-quality institutions than states with a history of anarchy. The legal
tradition hypothesis holds constant the quality of institutions and claims
that different legal institutions influence a government’s likelihood of
respecting human rights in different ways.

113 Putterman & Weil, Post-1500, supra note 101; Valerie Bockstette, Areendam Chanda,
& Louis Putterman, States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start, 7 J. ECON. GROWTH 347
(2002); Areendam Chanda & Loyis Putterman, Early Starts, Reversals and Catch-Up in the Process of
Economic Development, 109 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 387 (2007).
114
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Figure 9: State Centralization and Human Rights Scores

Figure 9 explores the relationship between two measures of early state
centralization and current human rights practices.115 The independent
variable in Panel A is the number of years (measured in thousands) since a
country transitioned from hunting and gathering to agriculture. The
independent variable in Panel B is an index of a state’s history that
measures the amount of state centralization prior to 1500 AD on a scale of
0 to 1.116 Following Putterman and Weil, both the Agriculture Years and
State History variables are adjusted to account for migration.117 The
115 The data for the independent variables in Figure 9 is from Putterman & Weil, Post1500, supra note 101. We would also like to thank C. Justin Cook for sharing data.
116 The State History variable is calculated using a complicated process that discounts
years prior to 1500 A.D. For more information on how the measure was created, see id. and
Chanda & Putterman, Early Starts, supra note 113.
117
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justification is that migrants bring the advantage of early centralization with
them when they move to new places, so the “adjusted variables measure the
average level of such advantages in a present day country as the weighted
average of [Agricultural Years or State History] in the countries of ancestry,
with weights equal to the population today.”118 Panels A and B reveal a
positive relationship between early state centralization and current human
rights practices, but the relationships do not achieve statistically significant.
4. Conclusion
Our data are consistent with the institutional lag hypothesis, but the
correlations are noticeably weaker than the geographic and institutional
transplant correlations. As is apparent in the figures, the coefficients are
small and not statistically significant.119
D. Historical Technological Advantages
A related idea is that countries with technological advantages at an
early stage of their development receive a head start that allows them to
enjoy greater development today. We first explore this hypothesis directly,
and then consider a related hypothesis that historical technological
adoption may influence modern gender rights.
1. Technological Adoption
Comin et al. test the relationship between “technological adoption” of
specific technologies in 1000 BC, 0 AD, and 1500 AD, and the current
wealth of nations.120 The variables for each time are composite indexes that
account for whether a country had adopted a number of “cutting edge”
technologies by that year.121 For example, the technological index for 1500
AD measures whether a country had ships capable of crossing the Atlantic
Ocean or gunpowder-based weapons.122 Comin et al. find that
technological adoption in 1500 AD is a statistically significant predictor of
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modern GDP per capita and technological adoption across countries.123
Moreover, the authors find this relationship both in specific locations and,
like Putterman and Weil124 , for populations that have migrated from place
to place.125 These results suggest that population groups transmit
institutions, norms, or skills over generations, so that head-starts are
preserved over very long periods of time.126
Historical technological development could affect a government’s
treatment of human rights through various pathways. Advanced
technology—including technology for writing, recording, monitoring, and
so on—may enable a population to create sophisticated institutions that
constrain government abuse of power, and can protect people’s interests. It
could also create an attitude of open-mindedness and willingness to tolerate
creative thought, which may in turn make people more tolerant of other
people’s rights and interests. To be sure, advanced technology may also
enable a government to oppress a population with greater effectiveness.
Figure 10 shows the relationship between early technological adoption
and current human rights practices. Panel A shows the relationship
between technological adoption in 0 AD and Human Rights Scores and Panel
B does so for technological adoption in 1500 AD. As Figure 9 shows,
higher rates of technological adoption in 0 AD are associated with worse
current human rights practices, but higher technological adoption in 1500
AD is associated with better human rights practices today. The second
result is consistent with the hypothesis, but the first result is hard to
explain. Neither correlation, however, is statistically significant.
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Figure 10: Technology Adoption and Human Rights Scores

2. Agriculture Technology & Gender Rights
In a recent paper, Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn
(AGN), find evidence that agricultural technology in pre-industrial societies
influence gender norms today.127 Ethnographic research suggests that more
rigid gender roles arose in farming communities that used the plow than in
farming communities that did not, perhaps because plow use, unlike other
agricultural practices, required upper-body strength possessed by men and
led to a farm-home division of labor. AGN find that more conservative
attitudes toward women and lower female participation in workplace,
entrepreneurial, and (more weakly) political activities, are found in modern
populations descended from communities that used the plow, and that
existed in areas where agricultural conditions made plow use optimal.128
The AGN theory is based on cultural transmission: gender norms that
reflected economic practices hundreds of years ago have persisted in
127
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populations even though the underlying economic conditions have
changed. If correct, the AGN theory implies that compliance with
CEDAW will be higher in countries with traditional plow use than in
countries that lack traditional plow use. In other words, adoption of the
plow hundreds of years ago should help to explain compliance with
contemporary international agreements on women’s rights.
Figure 11: Traditional Plow Use and Women’s Rights

Figure 11 shows the relationship between traditional plow use and
current women’s rights. Unlike the preceding figures, however, the
dependent variable in Figure 10 is not Human Rights Scores. This is because
the variable developed by Fariss is a composite of measures of state
repression (like torture and extra judicial killings), and does not try to
capture women’s rights.129 For the dependent variable in Figure 10 we use

129

See Fariss, supra note 24, at 301-304.

40

data on women’s rights in 2010 from the CIRI dataset.130 Panel A shows
the relationship between traditional plow use and women’s political rights,
and Panel B shows the relationship between traditional plow use and
women’s economic rights.131 Panel A reveals no evidence of a relationship
between traditional plow use and current women’s political rights. Panel B,
however, reveals a positive relationship between traditional plow use and
current women’s economics rights that is statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
The result for women’s economic rights is consistent with AGN’s
findings. We do not find similar results for political rights, mirroring to
some extent AGN’s weaker results for that variable. One reason for this
may be that gender norms that develop in societies without traditional plow
use permit women to work outside the household but do not imply
anything about the role of women in politics. Transmission of these cultural
norms over generations could lead to societies in which women have more
work choices and can earn more money, but not necessarily to societies in
which women participate in politics.
3. Conclusion
Our analysis revealed inconsistent evidence about the relationship
between historical technological adoption and current human rights
practices. Our analysis of technological adoption in 1000 AD and 1500 AD
did not reveal a statistically significant relationship with current Human
Rights Scores, but we did find a positive relationship between plough use
and measures of women’s economic rights. This suggests that more
research should be done to explore whether historical technology adoption
is related to current human rights practices generally, or respect for
women’s rights specifically.

Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 23. This data is publicly available at
<http://www.humanrightsdata.com/> (last visited February 27, 2015). The CIRI dataset is
commonly used by empirical studies on the effectiveness of international law on women’s
rights. See, e.g., Lupu, The Informative Power, supra note 2; Hill, Estimating the Effects, supra note 2.
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E. The Barrier Hypothesis
Recall that the barrier hypothesis was proposed to explain why
favorable institutions do not diffuse across countries.132 The theory is that
natural barriers like mountains and oceans block the transmission of norms.
To test this hypothesis, Spolaore and Wacziarg collect data on the genetic
difference between populations.133 The easiest way to understand the
genetic difference variable is to see it as measuring the extent to which two
populations share a common ancestry. Because of genetic drift, people who
share recent common ancestors have more similar DNA than people who
share only remote common ancestors. Spolaore and Wacziarg do not claim
that the genetic difference measures a population’s ability to generate
wealth.134 Instead, genetic difference is a proxy for cultural barriers—
language, social norms, and so on—which will be greater between groups
that split from each other in the remote past than those that split from each
other more recently.135
The authors look at the genetic difference between countries and the
United States, and hypothesize that countries with a greater genetic
difference from the United States population will have lower per capita
income than countries that have smaller genetic differences from the
United States. The reason that Spolaore and Wacziarg compare other
countries to the United States is because America is the world’s
“technological frontier.”136 Using genetic difference variables for the
present, for 1500, and for other historical periods, they find that genetic
difference is negatively related to per capita income.137 Countries with
different populations are less likely to enjoy the benefits of the
dissemination of new technologies and innovations than countries with
similar populations.
The same idea may be true with human rights. The modern notion of
human rights originated in the Enlightenment in Western Europe.138 The
British took these ideas to America; Napoleon spread them to the rest of
132
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Europe. Over the next two centuries, Enlightenment ideas emphasizing
human rights spread throughout the world, in part as a result of
colonialism, and in part as the result of the natural diffusion of ideas. If the
cultural barriers hypothesis is correct, and if genetic difference is a proxy
for cultural barriers, then populations with greater genetic distance should
enjoy fewer human rights protections
Figure 12: Genetic Distance to the U.S. and Human Rights Scores

Figure 12 shows the relationship between genetic distance to the
United States and countries’ Human Rights Scores. In Panel A the variable on
the x-axis is the genetic distance to the United States based on both
countries’ populations in 1500 A.D. In Panel B, the variable on the x-axis is
the genetic distance to the United States based on both countries’ current
populations, which accounts for migration patterns over the last 500 years.
For example, in 1500 A.D. the population of the United States comprised
North Amerindians, but the current population consists most of people of
English descent.139 In both panels, countries with further genetic distances
139
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from the United States have lower Human Rights Scores. These results are
both statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that future
research may productively benefit from applying Spolaore and Wacziarg’s
methods to human rights.
F. The Influence of Human Rights Practices in the Past
Finally, we look at how variables that measure human rights practices
in the past predict current rights practices. The major theme of the articles
we have discussed is that a country’s economic development today is a
function of its economic development in the distant past. Countries do not
necessarily catch up with each other; advantages linger. To examine this
idea, the economic development literature focuses on variables that capture
historical economic conditions or geographic or demographic factors
thought to be relevant to historical economic conditions. As we have
argued, these factors may be relevant to human rights conditions today as
well.
But this theme also suggests that it would be fruitful to look at
historical human rights indicators. Consider again the argument that respect
for human rights is a cultural trait. Once the idea of human rights is
introduced in a country, it will gradually become entrenched in a population
as it is transmitted down to future generations. This argument suggests that
respect for human rights in the past predicts respect for human rights
today. The institutional arguments (including the lag and transplant
arguments) have the same implications. If human rights are most likely
respected in countries with high-quality institutions (or institutions of a
certain type), and high-quality institutions persist over time, then respect for
human rights in the past should predict respect for human rights today.140
Because collection of human rights data is a recent phenomenon, we
cannot use human rights data from the past to test this hypothesis. But we
can use historical data that indicates that a country has adopted norms,
laws, or practices that are consistent with what we now call human rights.

140 For related arguments in the literature, see Paola Giuliano & Nathan Nunn, The
Transmission of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation-State, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 86 (2013),
who find that modern democracy indicators are higher in countries whose ancestral
populations in preindustrial times used consensus to choose leaders, and lower in countries
where leadership was inherited; and Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, Persecution
Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1339
(2011), who find that anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany was greatest in areas where
pogroms took place in the fourteenth century.
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We consider two such factors: a country’s history of women’s rights and a
country’s experience with slavery.
1. Women’s Rights
First, we look at the year in which a country granted the franchise to
women. Our hypothesis is that countries that granted the franchise for
women in the distant past are more likely to respect women’s rights today
than countries that granted the franchise more recently—and we mean
rights of all types, not just the right to vote. This hypothesis is based on the
theory that cultural practices that are relatively favorable for women in
particular countries both ensure that the franchise is granted at a relatively
early stage and that rights protections are granted to women sooner rather
than later.
Figure 13: Years Since Women’s Suffrage and Women’s Rights

Figure 13 shows the relationship between the years since women were
granted suffrage and current women’s rights. This is the same women’s
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rights data from the CIRI dataset used in Figure 11.141 Panel A shows the
relationship between years since women’s suffrage and women’s political
rights, and Panel B shows the relationship between years since women’s
suffrage at women’s economic rights.142 In Both Panel A and Panel B, there
is a strong positive relationship between the year that women obtained
suffrage and current human rights practices.143 Both correlations are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
2. Legacy of Slavery
Second, we look at the relationship between a country’s experience
with slavery and its human rights performance today. We first do so by
looking at the relationship between the number of years since a country
abolished slavery and its Human Rights Scores.144 As Panel A shows, there is a
positive and highly significant relationship between the year that a country
abolished slavery and its current levels of state repressions. In other words,
countries that were early adopters of good human rights practices hundreds
of years ago are still among the best countries today.145
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143 We further explore this relationship in Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Impact
of Historical Conditions on Human Rights: The Case of Slavery, Literacy, and Women’s Franchise (unpub.
m.s., 2015).
144 This data was collected for this project. The years since slavery was abolished
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available). Countries where slavery was not yet abolished in 2010 were coded as 0. We
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Cf. Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, & Maya Sen, The Political Legacy of American
Slavery (unpub. manuscript, 2014) (finding that whites who live in Southern countries that had
a high proportion of slaves in 1986 have more negative attitudes toward African-Americans
today).
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Figure 14: Legacy of Slavery and Human Rights Scores

As another test of the relationship between a country’s experience
with slavery and respect for human rights, we investigate whether a theory
developed by the economist Nathan Nunn on the legacy of slavery on
economic growth also applies to human rights.146 Nunn tests the theory
that the slave trade damaged political institutions in affected countries in
Africa. Nunn examines the pattern of slave trading in Africa from the
1400s to the 1900s, and distinguishes populations that were more
significantly victimized by slave raids from those that were less so.147 He
finds that African countries today with lower economic growth are located
in the areas where slave exportation was most common.148 Nunn argues
that slave raids destroyed government institutions, sowed distrust, and
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created conflict that undermined institutional development in countries that
were most affected by them.149
If Nunn’s theory is right, then African countries where slave
exportation was most common should also have low human rights scores
today. We test this hypothesis and graph the results in the right hand panel
of Figure 14. Panel B of Figure 14 indeed shows a negative relationship
between slave exports and human rights scores that is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that, consistent with Nunn’s
theory, the destruction of political institutions by the slave trade has had a
lasting, negative impact on human rights in that country.
Nunn’s theory focuses on the destructive effect of slave-trading on
trust and political institutions. Other scholars have proposed narrower
pathways of influence with more direct implications for human rights.
Dalton and Leung argue that slavery, by depleting the population of men in
affected societies, resulted in the rise of polygyny, which has persisted long
after the slave trade ended.150 Polygyny in turn is associated with worse
human rights outcomes for women than for men. Accordingly, it seems
likely that the governments of populations whose ancestors were victimized
by the slave trade will today have more trouble complying with the rights in
CEDAW.
III. DISCUSSION
As our analysis in the previous section revealed, the hypotheses that
have been generated by the development economics literature are able to
explain some of the variance in current human rights practices. In this
section, we discuss the implications of our findings. First, we consider the
relationship between economic growth and human rights generally. Second,
we explain how our arguments could be extended from explaining civil and
political rights to cultural, social, and economic rights. Finally, we describe
the relationship between our analysis and previous studies on the
effectiveness of human rights agreements.
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A. The Relationship Between Economic Growth & Human Rights
We have shown that historical and geographic factors that are
correlated with national wealth are also correlated with human rights
protection. However, it has long been known that national wealth is
positively correlated with human rights protection.151 In fact, GDP is one
of the key independent variables that have become part of the “Standard
Model” to explain levels of government repression.152 So we have merely
confirmed this relationship, albeit indirectly?
No. First, all of the historical variables that we use in our analysis
have been shown by previous studies to have a statistically significant
relationship with current economic conditions in countries around the
world. Our analysis, however, revealed statistically significant correlations
between only nine of the 17 variables and human rights performance.153
Not all historical variables that predict current national wealth also predict
current human rights practices.
Second, our results complicate the repression literature by suggesting
that wealth and respect for human rights are jointly caused by historical
factors. The repression literature does not untangle the direction of
causation between wealth and human rights. Indeed, while that literature
might seem to suggest that the best route to human rights protection is
wealth—which in turn suggests that free trade and economic development
are key for ending human rights abuses—our findings do not support such
an optimistic conclusion. Autocracies that discover natural resource
bonanzas do not necessarily convert into liberal democracies. They may
collapse into civil war (Congo) or simply remain autocratic (Saudi Arabia)
or even become more autocratic (Venezuela).
Third, we have also shown that historical variables that have not
previously been identified by the development literature—like the year that
countries granted suffrage to women154—are also strong predictors of
current rights practices. The idea that cultural and institutional determinates
of human rights change very slowly is intuitive and yet has been disregarded
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by the empirical human rights literature. Future research should explore
historical factors that have not yet been identified.
B. Development & Social, Cultural, & Economic Rights
For most of our analysis, the dependent variable that we use is the
Human Rights Score developed by Christopher Fariss,155 which is a composite
variable that measures a countries’ level of latent repression.156 All of the
variables included in Fariss’ model are measures of civil and political
rights.157 They are accordingly a reasonable approximation of compliance
with the ICCPR.
However, the ICCPR is just one of numerous treaties. The ICESCR,
for example, protect a range of so-called positive rights, including rights to
housing, medical care, education, and welfare. While the ICSCER has
generated a huge doctrinal literature, scholars have tested none of its
provisions. A few studies have tested the effect of the positive and nondiscrimination rights in CEDAW, but much more work needs to be done.
As far as we know, no one has tested the effects of the CERD.
Researchers who are interested in the effect of international law on
the behavior of countries should test these treaties. Does racial
discrimination decline in countries that ratify the CERD? Does sex
discrimination decline in countries that ratify CEDAW? We conjecture that
respect for these positive and nondiscrimination rights is rooted in
historical conditions rather than ratification patterns.
To test this conjecture, we are examining in other work how historical
attitudes towards women influence current compliance with international
obligations—most notably the CEDAW—to protect the rights of women.
Our preliminary research suggests that a great deal of current compliance
with contemporary obligations can be explained by historical attitudes to
women that long pre-date the ratification of the CEDAW.
C. Implications for The Effectiveness of Human Rights Agreements
As we previously discussed, empirical studies that have examined
whether the ratification of international human rights agreements has
155

See Fariss, supra note 24.

156

Id. at 301.

157

For a list of the variables included by Fariss, see id. at 301-304.

50

improved human rights practices have produced mixed results.158 A
number of studies have found either negative results (that is, ratifying
human rights agreements is associated with worse human rights practice)159
or null results (ratifying human rights agreements has no relationship to
human rights practices).160
The studies that have found a positive effect have not claimed that
the ratification of human rights treaties has a consistently positive effect on
human rights practices across all countries. Instead, the positive effects that
have been found have been limited to certain sets of countries. For
example, Beth Simmons has argued that human rights agreements can
improve the human rights practices in “transitioning democracies.”161
Similarly, Yonathan Lupu has found that the ratification of certain human
rights agreements can result in improved human rights practices when there
is either an independent judiciary162 or legislative veto players to check the
executive.163
In this paper, we do not attempt to directly test or question these
findings. Our analysis showing that current human rights practices are
strongly related to historical factors does not necessarily mean that
ratification of human rights agreements has not resulted in improved
human rights practices for some countries in some issue areas. It remains
possible that treaties have a residual effect beyond what can be explained by
historical conditions and related factors.
We do argue, however, that contemporary factors—like the
ratification of a specific treaty—are likely to have a relatively small effect on
current human rights practices compared to historical factors. For example,
our analysis would suggest that researchers interested in understanding the
current rates of torture across countries would learn more from studying
the development of high-quality institutions over time than from looking at
ratification patterns of the CAT.
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CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that the variation in respect for human rights
across countries reflects, in part, conditions in those countries (or relevant
populations) in the distant past. We find evidence that climate (latitude,
mean distance to coast or river, percentage of land within 100 kilometers of
coast or river), institutional transplant (settler mortality, European share of
population during colonization), and possibly institutional lag and/or
cultural transmission (years since slavery abolished, traditional plow use,
years since women’s suffrage), have long-term effects on a country’s human
rights performance in the theoretically correct direction. Other variables we
examined, most of them focused on institutional and technological lag
(legal origin, historical population density, measures of historical state
centralization, historical technological adoption, genetic distance), are more
weakly correlated with human rights performance.
If these results are validated with further statistical testing, they will
help explain why the human rights treaties have had a small impact on
countries’ performance. As we have stressed, the results parallel the finding
in the development literature, which suggests that much of the variation in
economic growth across countries reflects historical and geological factors.
We should be clear that our results do not prove that human rights
treaties do not or cannot influence human rights. The economic
development literature itself indicates that historical conditions only partly
explain differences in economic growth across countries. But our results do
show that the failure by academics to find an impact for most human rights
provisions may be a consequence of the dominance of historical factors
rather than coding problems or other methodological problems. And they
suggest that the few studies that do find that human rights treaties have had
an impact should be revisited.164
Our results cast doubt on traditional notions that human rights
treaties affect the behavior of states because governments have voluntarily
submitted to the treaties, and on the relevance of the huge growth in the
activity of NGOs, national human rights institutions, and other
organizations involved in advocating for, monitoring, and enforcing human
rights.165 While we cannot rule out these theories, our suspicion is that
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compliance with human rights treaties and NGO activities are mostly
endogenous to historical conditions.
The modern idea of human rights originated in a small area of
Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While it was
immensely influential in a small number of countries at that time—
including France, Britain, and the Netherlands—it would not have an
impact on other countries for many years. The ideas spread to foreign
countries, but conditions were not always ripe for their reception. They
were later forcibly imposed by settlers, colonists, and soldiers, but
incorporating these ideas into institutions, and persuading people to
abandon one set of beliefs for another, was hard work (especially, when the
ideas were brought by conquerors who did not respect the human rights of
native populations).
The human rights treaty regime is the latest attempt by Westerners to
advance Enlightenment values through a mixture of persuasion and force.
Perhaps, it has had some effect. But seen as the latest step in a historical
process that goes back many centuries, it would be surprising if this effect
were more than incremental.
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APPENDIX

Correlations Between Independent Variables and Current Human Rights

Latitude (Absolute Value)
Mean Distance to Coast or River
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River
Settler Mortality (log)
European Share of Population During Colonization
British Legal Origin
French Legal Origin
Population Density in 1000 AD
Population Density in 1500 AD
Ancestry Adjusted Agriculture Years
Ancestry Adjusted State History
Technology Adoption in 0 AD
Technology Adoption in 1500 AD
Genetic Distance to the U.S., 1500 AD Match
Genetic Distance to the U.S., Current Match
Years Since Slavery Abolished
Total Slave Exports by Land Area (ln)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001

Women’s
Political
Rights
Traditional Plow Use
-0.00
Years Since Women’s Suffrage
0.30 ***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.01
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Human
Rights Score
0.32
***
-0.27
***
0.40
***
-0.34
**
0.34
**
0.03
-0.10
-0.01
-0.01
0.09
0.07
-0.08
0.11
-0.17
*
-0.18
*
0.38
***
-0.36
*

Women’s
Economic
Rights
0.23 **
0.34 ***
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